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Abstract 
Canada has experienced two formal federal ministries dedicated to addressing urban issues. 
The first, the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, encountered resistance from provincial 
governments and its fellow departments. Both worked to undermine it. The second, the 
Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities, was created with a more conciliatory 
tone towards the provincial governments and its ministerial colleagues. This paper examines 
the establishment of both ministries and tracks their efforts using a policy learning and 
lesson-drawing framework, concluding that common institutional actors, such as the Privy 
Council, were responsible for the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities’ 
change in tone and approach to multilevel governance. General lessons are drawn about 
inter-governmental relations and multi-level policy formation in federal systems. 
 
1. Introduction 
In 1971, the Trudeau government announced the creation of the Ministry of State for Urban 
Affairs (MSUA). The ministry was intended to coordinate urban policy in Canada, but was 
abruptly dismantled in 1978. In The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs: A Courageous 
Experiment in Public Administration, H. Peter Oberlander, the former Deputy Minister, 
argues that the ministry’s downfall resulted from a concerted effort by both line ministries 
and provincial governments to undercut MSUA because they felt its existence threatened or 
encroached upon their jurisdictions. Nearly thirty years later, Paul Martin’s government 
created the Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities (MSIC) with similar goals 
to MSUA. MSIC, however, would find more success with provincial governments and its 
fellow departments, largely because of its more cautious approach to intergovernmental and 
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interdepartmental relations. How and why did this change in direction and policy occur? Did 
the experiences of MSUA shape the direction of MSIC? Or was the more cautious nature of 
MSIC the result of thirty years general experience with intergovernmental and 
interdepartmental interaction? 
 
This paper examines and tests two hypotheses through primary document analysis and 
interviews conducted with ministry officials. The first hypothesis argues that institutional 
policy learning was occurring, and once Martin’s government began to address urban issues, 
it employed a concerted strategy to avoid the perceived failures of MSUA. The alternative 
hypothesis argues that the altered approach of MSIC was merely the result of thirty years of 
general institutional experience with intergovernmental and interdepartmental interaction.  
 
2. Policy Learning 
Policy learning can be seen as the result of efforts to improve or enhance policy-making 
based on the assessment of past experiences (Etheredge and Short 1983; Sabatier 1988; Rose 
1988). There are two views of this process. Peter Hall (1993) introduces us to ‘endogenous 
learning’. Hall defines this activity as a “deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques 
of policy in the light of the consequences of past policy and new information so as to better 
attain the ultimate objects of governance” (Hall 1993:278). By contrast, Hugh Heclo (1974) 
argues that learning is more of a government response to exogenous change in a policy 
environment. In these terms, learning is more a reaction on the part of governments to new 
situations, albeit taking into account their past experience. 
 
Bennett and Howlett (1992) find both stark differences and similarities between these two 
paradigms. They ask three distinct questions about each approach: who learns, what do they 
learn and to what effect? Based on these three questions, Bennett and Howlett create three 
typologies: government learning, lesson-drawing and social learning (1992:289). In the 
government learning paradigm, state officials conduct policy learning in order to effect 
organizational change. In the lesson-drawing typology, policy networks learn to effect 
program change, whilst social learning involves broader policy communities (groups of 
stakeholders) who influence policy paradigms (Bennett and Howlett 1992:289). 
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Andrew Stritch (2005) explores a contemporary example of policy learning in his 
examination of the origins of Quebec’s worker compensation programming. Stritch explains 
that policy learning can be broadly defined as a process of evaluating new policy ideas, past 
practices and foreign precedents in the policy creation process (2005:553). It can thus be 
seen as a process of research and evaluation. Stritch further explains this process: 
“[governments] learn from the shortcomings of pre-existing programmes and practices in 
their own jurisdiction; they learn from the precedents of other jurisdictions; and they learn 
from the articulation of interests by societal participants in the course of the policy-making 
process” (2005:554). In this way, Stritch has provided a bridge for the endogenous and 
exogenous camps to cross: learning can take place based on both environmental and internal 
variables.  
 
While Stritch provides the broader definition of policy learning, the term requires 
operationalization. Two direct criteria for observing policy learning would need to occur. 
First, there would need to be recognition of previous policy work in the field. This can take 
several forms, such as a formal review of previous policy efforts in the field or informal 
acknowledgement of an understanding of past policy processes by ministry officials. It 
would involve a concerted effort to recognize successes and failures of past policy 
experiences. The second criteria would be an intentional effort to avoid the noted failures 
and emulate the successes of past policy efforts in the field. Policy learning can thus be 
operationalized as a process of evaluating the successes and failures of past policy processes 
while utilizing such information to improve contemporary policy creation and 
implementation. Uncovering policy learning therefore depends upon finding 1) a recognition 
of previous policy efforts in the field and 2) a concerted effort to avoid the failures and 
emulate the successes of the past policy paradigm. 
 
3. The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 
The creation of MSUA was announced on June 30, 1971 with the stated goal of “the 
development and application of policies to influence the urbanization process” (MSUA 
1972:1). The role of the ministry was seen as limited to planning, coordination and research 
functions and its activities were restricted mostly to enhancing cooperation between different 
levels of government, as evidenced by the tri-level meeting that MSUA organized in Toronto 
 SPICER: Institutional policy learning and formal federal-urban engagement  
 
CJLG November 2010 102  
in 1972 (MSUA 1973:i). Despite this limited mandate, the provincial governments were 
apprehensive. MSUA aroused the suspicions of the provinces, who believed that MSUA was 
an attempt to impinge upon traditional areas of provincial jurisdiction (Feldman and Graham 
1979:xvii). Because of these early suspicions, the provinces were initially reluctant to 
participate in any sort of tri-level meetings that addressed urban affairs (Feldman and 
Graham 1979:xix). Eventually the provinces agreed to meet, but the assembled provincial 
representatives made it clear that they would not tolerate any interference in their 
jurisdiction. Saskatchewan Premier Alan Blakney spoke on behalf of the provinces by stating 
that: “we want our constitutional rights respected” (Watkins 1972:3). The federal 
government was on notice: tread carefully when addressing urban issues.  
 
During the1973-74 fiscal year, the ministry undertook a number of significant research 
projects, such as examining urban waterfronts, rail links in city centres, municipal financing, 
and urban management training studies (MSUA 1974:9). There was also a renewed focus on 
interdepartmental and intergovernmental cooperation within this period, while the scope of 
the ministry’s intergovernmental meetings increased. The President of the Canadian 
Federation of Mayors and Municipalities was established as a co-chair of the next tri-level 
meeting (MSUA 1974: 9). Tri-level meetings eventually became policy specific to each 
province, focusing on issues such as housing and environmental sustainability (MSUA 1974: 
9). MSUA held metropolitan tri-level meetings in Halifax-Dartmouth, Quebec City, 
Vancouver and Winnipeg intended to address issues specific to each city, such as regional 
growth in Halifax-Dartmouth and Quebec City, the development of transportation hubs in 
Vancouver, and organizational development for municipal administrators in Winnipeg 
(MSUA 1974:4).  
 
During 1973-74, MSUA also had an increased focus on inter-departmental cooperation. For 
example, early in 1973, MSUA initiated a committee with the Ministry of Finance to 
compile a database of municipal property tax rates across the country (MSUA 1974:5). 
Later, in July 1973, the Senior Interdepartmental Committee on Urban Affairs was 
established, which brought together 15 administrators from different departments, such as 
the Treasury Board, Finance, and Public Works, and was chaired by the Secretary of MSUA 
(MSUA 1974:2). Then minister, Ron Basford, was clear about how he viewed MSUA. To 
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Basford, the ministry’s main role was coordination, not funding: “We cannot deal with urban 
problems merely by transferring more and more money from one pocket to another” (Barker 
1973:9).  
 
Basford was replaced by Barney Danson in 1974. The ministry maintained its focus on 
intergovernmental and interdepartmental cooperation, but such efforts remained relatively 
stagnant. The national, provincial and municipal tri-level meetings remained in place, as well 
as the inter-departmental working groups and the Senior Interdepartmental Committee on 
Urban Affairs, but the ministry was less active in these areas. Its focus began to shift towards 
specific project funding, a departure from Basford’s view that MSUA should be a 
coordinating and not a funding ministry.  
 
Project funding began to increase in 1974-75. MSUA got heavily involved with land-use 
planning and helped in the construction of various urban projects, either in a financial or 
advisory role. Thus in 1974-75, MSUA helped Toronto develop its waterfront; in Calgary it 
assisted in the design and development of 400 acres of publicly held land; and in Vancouver 
it supported the expansion of the city’s airport (MSUA 1975:4). This focus on project 
funding was maintained through 1975-76, with support to the Greater Vancouver Regional 
District, the City of Toronto and Halifax-Dartmouth (MSUA 1976:2).  
 
In 1976, Andre Ouellet replaced Danson and quickly began reducing the size of the ministry 
and reorganizing its internal operations (MSUA 1977:13). Instead of having a number of 
separate departments, two were created: Urban Analysis and Urban Coordination (MSUA 
1977:4). Urban Analysis handled interdepartmental urban-related policy and research, while 
Urban Coordination communicated with municipalities and other governments (MSUA 
1977: 13). In every province, this coordination increased. For example, in Newfoundland, 
the ministry assisted with regional growth and development, and in Ontario it helped to force 
the arbitration of unused public land, assisted Toronto in the planning of a new waterfront, 
coordinated activities in railway redevelopment, and arranged the relocation of several army 
bases (MSUA 1977:5). This pattern continued through 1977-78.  
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Over its lifetime, the positioning of MSUA changed. The 1973-74 report states that the 
primary role of the ministry was “urban policy planning”, which would be accomplished 
through policy development, urban research and coordination with different levels of 
government (MSUA 1974:i). In 1974-75, MSUA began describing itself as an agency 
designed for “formulating a set of national objectives for Canada’s future urban 
development” (MSUA 1975:1). In 1975-76, the ministry’s focus turned to the “development 
of urban-sensitive federal public-policy” (MSUA 1976:1). By 1977-78 the tone and mission 
had changed once again, the MSUA annual report noting that the ministry was primarily a 
“coordinating agency of the federal government concerned with ensuring, as far as is 
possible, that federal policies, programs and projects are undertaken with an awareness of 
their implications for the social, cultural and economic well-being of urban areas in Canada” 
(MSUA 1978:3). This reflected an earlier shift in government policy. MSUA’s 1976-77 
report had included a preface entitled “The Federal Role in Urban Affairs” which stated: 
Constitutionally, responsibility for Canada’s municipalities and matters of local 
concern rests solely with the provincial and municipal governments. The federal 
government recognizes and supports this arrangement. The federal government also 
recognizes that it has constitutional responsibilities to carry out, and in doing so, 
federal policies, programs and projects affect the pattern, economic base and quality 
of life in Canadian settlements. This situation means that the federal government, 
given its concern with how it affects all Canadians, has a responsibility to ensure that 
its activities are beneficial to urban areas and that federal initiatives take into account 
provincial and local objectives and plans (MSUA 1977:3).  
 
The 1977-78 report took a more cautious tone towards the provinces, stating that “the 
ministry cooperates with other federal departments and agencies, the provinces and, through 
them, their municipalities” (MSUA 1978:3). It continued: “the purpose of such cooperation 
is to seek provincial and municipal views and policy positions on urban issues” 
(MSUA1978:4). Thus over time, we see the tone of the ministry softening as it attempted to 
convince the provinces that it was respecting their jurisdiction. The gradual emergence of the 
provinces role within MSUA’s mandate reflects the criticism the ministry was receiving. It 
evidently felt the need to reiterate that it was not a lone actor in this policy field.  
 
Nevertheless, in November 1978 it was announced that MSUA would close the following 
year. Through its lifetime, MSUA had passed through a number of stages, beginning first as 
a forum for discussion and coordination, before moving onto direct project funding. When 
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direct project funding increased, so did the ire of the provinces, who began to feel threats to 
their jurisdiction. Oberlander (1987) has provided an account of the intergovernmental 
tension faced during his tenure as Deputy Minister of MSUA. Recounting provincial-federal 
relations, Oberlander states the following: 
The Provinces, having been alerted to the increasingly strong Federal position in 
urban issues, perceived a dire threat in a Federal/municipal alliance on urban  affairs 
and demanded their explicit and exclusive Constitutional jurisdiction and ultimately 
succeeded in undercutting MSUA. The Ministry was offered up upon the altar of 
Federal-Provincial relations. (Oberlander and Fallick 1987:132) 
 
Of the two areas that Oberlander identified as factors contributing to MSUA’s decline, 
intergovernmental tensions were the most public. Interdepartmental tension, the second 
factor identified by Oberlander as a cause of the ministry’s downfall, was less publicized and 
more challenging to account for. According to Oberlander appeared to raise tensions 
(Oberlander and Fallick 1987:131). Oberlander uses the urban transportation policy as an 
example: “as MSUA offered advice in the field of transportation and its impact on 
urbanization and regional development, eg: Toronto Airport II and Mirabel, the Ministry of 
Transport felt threatened and felt its advice undercut at Cabinet level” (Oberlander and 
Fallick 1987, 131). Such tensions are not documented in annual reports and rarely find a 
place in the national media, which is why Oberlander’s candid commentary is invaluable in 
understanding why MSUA was so abruptly dissolved.  
  
4. The Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities 
During the 2000 election, the Liberal policy platform contained a promise to establish a 
Prime Minister’s Task Force on Urban Issues (Globe and Mail 2002, A14). Soon after the 
election, the Prime Minister’s Task Force was established with Toronto MP Judy Sgro as 
Chair (Winsor 2002, A4). The Caucus Task Force report argued that the government must 
implement a national urban strategy that would balance municipal rights and responsibilities 
with those of the federal government, providing investment in urban centres. The report 
states that this urban strategy would entail: “an enhanced relationship between the 
Government of Canada and among our urban partners, provincial and municipal 
governments, the private sector, community and business leaders and the voluntary sector” 
(Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues 2002:5). The government planned on 
being only one part of this national strategy, not the lead. Thus the report talks of a national 
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urban partnership that “will guide strategic federal capital-investment in our cities and will 
improve the quality of life for millions of Canadians living in our urban regions” (Prime 
Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues 2002, 5). The federal government would 
enter into projects with municipalities as long as such projects complied with basic federal 
guidelines, such as enhancing the quality of life, conforming with standards of fiscal 
accountability, and contributing to sustainable development (Prime Minister’s Caucus Task 
Force on Urban Issues 2002: 7). 
 
The task force recommended that a cabinet minister be designated with the responsibility of 
coordinating the federal government’s efforts and investments in urban centres (Prime 
Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues 2002, 8). At the same time, this individual 
would act as the “voice” for cities around the cabinet table, ensuring that the federal 
government could not overlook pressing urban issues (Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force 
on Urban Issues 2002:8).  
 
The task force’s report went largely unfulfilled during the end of Jean Chrétien’s term as 
Prime Minister, and Chrétien instructed the task force to avoid specific commitments 
(Winsor 2002, A4). Clearly worried about a provincial backlash towards federal efforts, 
Chrétien, upon being questioned about his task force’s efforts, stated that: “the cities are 
under provincial responsibility; we are not in a position to give them more power” (Winsor 
2002, A4).  
 
As the task force did its work and while Finance Minister Paul Martin was suggesting a ‘new 
deal’ for cities, the provinces were providing warnings to the federal government to tread 
carefully. Ontario Finance Minister Janet Ecker warned the federal government to not 
address taxation powers (Lewington 2002, A6). “We are willing to join the emerging 
dialogue about a new deal for cities – if it’s the right one,” stated Ecker, showing both 
enthusiasm and restraint about the prospects of a renewed federal-municipal urban strategy 
(Lewington 2002, A6). Ecker stated that any new taxing authority for municipalities had to 
come with a “precondition” between the federal government and the provinces that would 
“restore the balance between revenue and funding responsibilities for all levels of 
government in Canada” (Lewington 2002, A6).  
 SPICER: Institutional policy learning and formal federal-urban engagement  
 
CJLG November 2010 107  
Even with provincial concerns noted, Chrétien had an interest in urban issues, as evidenced 
through his $76 million urban transit grant to the City of Toronto and his commitment to 
improve urban housing (Winsor 2002, A4). The Office of Infrastructure and Crown 
Corporations was created in 2002, with a mandate to coordinate the public service’s existing 
infrastructure (Forster 2010). The 2002 budget allowed for the creation of the Canadian 
Strategic Infrastructure Fund (CSIF) (Juneau 2010). The decision initially had to be made of 
whether to establish a foundation to distribute the funds from the CSIF or to create a small, 
bureaucratic department (Juneau 2010). In the end, with the input of senior public servants, 
the government opted to create a small department housed in the Treasury Board with 
responsibility for the portfolio assigned to cabinet minister Allan Rock (Juneau 2010).  
 
Chrétien was interested in assisting Canada’s cities but was unwilling to create a formal 
department to address urban issues. Paul Martin, however, was willing, although his 
proposed ‘new deal’ was short on specifics and he rejected the notion of sharing gas tax 
revenue very early on (Scoffield 2002a). “The finance minister did not offer any money…he 
offered understanding,” stated Jack Layton, then the President of the Federation of Canadian 
Municipalities. “He sympathizes with our problem, he is concerned about our problem, but 
there was a remarkably empty chequebook in the discussion” (Scoffield 2002a).  
 
While running for the leadership of the Liberal Party, Martin began to address specifics 
about his ‘new deal’. Martin argued that Ottawa should cede some taxation sources to 
municipalities so that cities would not have to rely on property tax as a main source of 
revenue (Scoffield 2002b, A4). “Property taxes were meant for snow removal and garbage 
collection,” stated Martin, “they were not meant to take on the vast range of social programs 
cities face today” (Scoffield 2002b, A4). Additionally, Martin’s plan would rely on the 
creation of government programs that would address urban issues, such as direct funding 
mechanisms (Scoffield 2002b, A4). Martin, much like Chrétien, was aware of provincial 
concerns about taxation and programming, as his ‘new deal’ was criticized by the 
government of Quebec as a way of siphoning money away from the province’s health and 
education services (Scoffield 2002b, A4). “Without the full co-operation of the provinces,” 
stated Martin, “a ‘new deal’ doesn’t have a chance to get off the ground” (Scoffield 2002b, 
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A4). Much like Chrétien, Martin knew that he would have to tread carefully in the face of 
provincial demands, although he still planned to push ahead with his ambitious program.  
 
Upon becoming Prime Minister in 2003, Paul Martin began to fulfill his ‘new deal’ vision, 
appointing a parliamentary secretary to the Prime Minster with sole responsibility for urban 
issues (Plunkett 2004:23). While this step fell short of the full cabinet minister recommended 
in the 2002 task force report, it was still seen as a positive step forward (Plunkett 2004, 23). 
Martin selected Toronto MP John Godfrey to be the new parliamentary secretary with an 
emphasis on cities (Globe and Mail 2003, A13). Godfrey’s role was still ambiguous at this 
time, a fact that Godfrey himself readily acknowledged, but one that came with a direct 
mandate to listen to mayors and city councils, recommend solutions to the government and 
implement federal policies, negotiating with the provinces to ensure the approval of all levels 
of government (Rusk 2003, A18). Godfrey acknowledged the role of the provinces upon 
assuming the post: “we’ve got to work with the provinces to come up with goals that all 
three levels of government would say ‘that’s right’” (Rusk 2003, A18). 
 
Godfrey spent the next several months meeting with provincial leaders, ensuring they were 
comfortable with Martin’s proposed revised relationship with cities, commenting that: “what 
we want to do is the maximum possible to work together in partnership with the provinces” 
(Lewington 2004, A14). However, even with that noted, Godfrey stated that he would be 
prepared to move forward with the plan even if not all the provinces approved (Lewington 
2004, A14).  
 
Martin also established a fifteen-member committee, chaired by former British Columbia 
Premier Mike Harcourt, that would oversee the implementation of the ‘new deal’ along with 
a permanent cities secretariat based out of the Privy Council Office that would oversee urban 
spending (Globe and Mail 2004, A12). Martin’s first budget began the process of changing 
the relationship between the federal government and cities. Martin eliminated the Goods and 
Service Tax on municipal expenditures and increased the amount of federal resources 
available to municipalities to nearly $7 billion (Liberal Party of Canada 2004:9).  
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As Martin headed into the 2004 election, he added to his existing urban plan through the 
Liberal Party platform, entitled Moving Canada Forward. The Liberal platform stated that if 
re-elected, municipalities would be included in pre-budget consultations, tripartite 
agreements would be extended, and municipalities would be provided with a share of the 
federal gas-tax (Liberal Party of Canada 2004:9). The language contained in Moving Canada 
Forward speaks of partnership and inclusion amongst all three levels of government. All 
three levels of government are described as “partners” and federal efforts are described as 
“co-operative” (Liberal Party of Canada 2004:9). At no point in Moving Canada Forward 
are the federal government’s efforts in municipalities described as one-sided.  
 
Soon after the election, Martin announced the creation of the Ministry of State for 
Infrastructure and Communities (MSIC) and appointed his former parliamentary secretary 
for urban issues, John Godfrey, to be the department’s first minister (Clark and Lewington 
2004, A7). Godfrey built on his work as parliamentary secretary and began to implement 
many of the initiatives described by Martin during the election campaign. Godfrey clarified 
his role in regard to the provinces: “The job now becomes to work with the provinces…in 
consultation with the municipalities to find a formula which advances the needs of the 
municipalities” (Taber 2004, A1).  
 
Godfrey’s tone was deliberate. He, and the senior bureaucrats who established MSIC, knew 
that if the ministry was not established as collaborative it would not succeed. Some initial 
ground rules were established when approaching the provinces. The most important rule was 
that communication was established as an exclusive two-way channel between the federal 
government and the provinces (Juneau, 2010). The federal government would never 
negotiate with cities or their provincial municipal associations, unless a province requested it 
(Juneau 2010). Nor would they seek input about projects from cities or invite cities to 
identify potential infrastructure projects (Juneau 2010). British Columbia and Ontario were 
the exceptions to this rule, as both provincial governments requested that MSIC negotiate the 
gas tax transfer directly with their provincial municipal associations (Juneau 2010). MSIC 
intended to telegraph a simple message to the provincial governments: the Ministry of State 
for Infrastructure and Communities was interested solely in cooperation with the provinces, 
not municipalities.  
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MSIC released its first annual report in the 2004-2005 fiscal year. The report acknowledged 
the earlier actions of the Martin government’s ‘new deal’, including GST rebates and the 
creation of the Cities Secretariat though the Privy Council, but made specific reference to 
“partnerships with [the] provinces” and “consultations with municipalities” (Infrastructure 
Canada 2004: 8). This positive tone continued as the report addressed previous government 
efforts to fund infrastructure: the Canada Infrastructure Works Program in 1994; the 
Infrastructure Canada program in 2000; the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund in 2003; 
the Prairie Grain Roads program in 2001 (Infrastructure Canada 2004, 8). Overall, the report 
noted over $12 billion in infrastructure investment since 1993 (Infrastructure Canada 2004, 
10). The intended message from this historical overview is simple: MSIC is merely 
providing a formal face to the investment completed by the governments of Paul Martin and 
Jean Chrétien.  
 
This initial report also laid out the new department’s mandate. The report notes that: “an 
important part of [the Ministry’s] mandate is to coordinate and manage funding programs 
that support public infrastructure initiatives, provide strategic advice and policy direction.” It 
continues: “Infrastructure Canada concentrates on policy development and on research…it is 
also responsible for communications and dissemination of information on the federal role 
and contributions to infrastructure in Canada” (Infrastructure Canada 2004:11). On the 
coordination side, the ministry was clear that it was coordinating federal policy and aligning 
the needs of municipalities through several federal agencies, such as the Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency, Western Economic Diversification Canada, Canada Economic 
Development for Quebec Regions, Industry Canada and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 
(Infrastructure Canada 2004:12). Much of this was similar to the previous Ministry of State 
for Urban Affairs in its initial mandate: it had coordinated policy activities amongst various 
actors, but specifically focused on policy coordination at the federal level.  
 
Where MSIC differs greatly from MSUA is in its approach to funding. MSIC’s first report is 
clear in its funding expectations and responsibilities: “provinces and municipalities are the 
managers of the projects while Infrastructure Canada provides policy leadership and 
horizontal coordination of project implementation” (Infrastructure Canada 2004:12). The 
ministry worked with the provinces and municipalities to identify “priority projects” and 
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from there, all three parties would: “clarify the scope and nature and funding mechanisms of 
these projects” (Infrastructure Canada 2004:11). Once a project is identified and approved, 
an environmental assessment and other procedures were completed and then a federal-
provincial/territorial management committee was established and a Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed to clarify the roles and responsibilities of both the provinces and 
the federal government (Infrastructure Canada 2004, 11). 
 
Thus from the inception of MSIC, the provinces and municipalities were in the driver’s seat, 
not the federal government – a clear and critical difference from previous efforts with formal 
federal engagement in the municipal sphere. The federal government alone was not 
identifying projects. Provincial involvement was not only encouraged but also demanded and 
sustained.  
 
MSIC’s 2005-2006 annual report mirrored the 2004-2005 report in tone and objectives, 
reiterating the ministry’s restrained approach to intergovernmental relations by stating that: 
Constitutionally, municipalities are under provincial jurisdiction. Respect for this 
jurisdiction is a central principle of the New Deal. The complex challenges that play 
out in cities and communities require a coordinated approach if workable solutions 
are to be found. A partnered approach is essential and approaches must be tailored to 
address the circumstances of different communities: urban and rural, large and small 
(Infrastructure Canada 2005:10).  
 
The interdepartmental strategy employed by MSIC was also significantly different from that 
of MSUA. The former Assistant Deputy Minister for MSIC notes that there was an initial 
fear about interdepartmental tensions, so the ministry met to figure out a way to manage 
expectations and ministerial “shopping lists” (Laroche 2010). MSIC was a funding ministry, 
with a budget allotment that was expected to reach more than $5 billion dollars over a five-
year period and nearly every ministry wanted a portion of it for their own projects (Laroche 
2010). Its solution was to focus on one guiding policy area: in this case, environmental 
sustainability. Every project that MSIC approached or approved had to be related to 
environmental sustainability and had to contribute to Canada reaching its Kyoto Agreement 
targets (Laroche 2010). Additionally, MSIC was clear that it would not consider or fund 
federal projects, which eliminated the possibility of funding the particular projects of 
different departments (Juneau 2010). 
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To ensure that MSIC’s relationship with other ministries was maintained, two committees 
were established: an interdepartmental infrastructure committee and an Assistant Deputy 
Minister working group. Both groups included representatives from MSIC together with 
Environment Canada, Treasury Board, Heritage Canada, the Privy Council Office, 
Intergovernmental Affairs, Human Resources and Skills Development, Agriculture, Industry 
Canada, and the regional development offices (Laroche 2010). These ongoing committees 
allowed MSIC to manage expectations and maintain effective communication with its fellow 
departments.  
 
With these procedures in place, André Juneau, the former Assistant Deputy Minister recalls 
only small amounts of tension with the Ministry of Transport. For the most part, their 
portfolios were interdependent. In cases of conflict over a certain project, MSIC would work 
in consultation with the Ministry of Transport: (Juneau2010). MSIC would be responsible 
for the funding, while Transport would be responsible for the negotiation process (Juneau 
2010). The current associate Deputy Minister for Infrastructure with Infrastructure Canada 
confirms that these strategies are still in place (Forster 2010).  
 
The 2006 federal election saw Paul Martin voted out of office. With Martin went any sense 
of enthusiasm to actively engage cities and communities. In his place, Stephen Harper and 
his Conservative party sought to run a leaner government and operated on the principles of 
‘open federalism’. The Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities was 
amalgamated with the Ministry of Transportation to create the revamped Ministry of 
Transport, Infrastructure and Communities. The rationale behind this consolidation was 
efficiency: “bringing the various tools and policy levers of this portfolio under the 
responsibility of a single minister offers great potential for strategic and coherent policy 
development” (Infrastructure Canada 2006:1). The minister responsible for the department, 
Lawrence Cannon, was just as positive about the amalgamation, stating that: “I believe that 
the alignment of Infrastructure Canada with Transport Canada and the Crown corporations 
will provide a tremendous opportunity to integrate federal efforts and address the pressing 
and long-term issues facing Canadians and our communities” (ibid). Additionally, the 
government stated that the amalgamation would allow the department to cooperate more 
efficiently with the provincial and municipal governments (Infrastructure Canada 2006:5).  
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5. Did Policy Learning Occur? 
To determine if policy learning was present when constructing the Ministry of State for 
Infrastructure and Communities, two criteria were established: 1) a recognition of previous 
policy efforts in the field and 2) a concerted effort to avoid the failures and emulate the 
successes of the past policy paradigm. 
 
Recognition of previous policy efforts 
Comments referencing MSUA in the media by members of the Chretien-Martin government 
are rare. From the outset, their government attempted to clarify its goals and aims in the 
urban policy realm. Chretien (Winsor 2004), Martin (Scoffield 2002b) and Godfrey (Rusk 
2003; Lewington 2004) were clear about the federal role in relation to the provinces. All 
three acknowledged that the provinces, constitutionally, had sole control of municipal affairs. 
They argued that existing federal policy had implications in the municipal sphere and, as 
such, a coordinating ministry should be created to enhance the effectiveness of those 
policies.  
 
Aside from a brief mention in its initial annual report, MSUA is not formally mentioned in 
MSIC documentation. However, André Juneau, the former Deputy Head of MSIC, provides 
some insight. Juneau states that those in the original Office of Infrastructure assembled a 
strategy to approach the provinces acknowledging that MSUA “antagonized the provinces”, 
and argued that “the constitution must be respected” (Juneau 2010). To Juneau, and many of 
those involved with the creation of MSIC, MSUA had not had a large impact and failed to 
change the course of urban Canada (Juneau 2010). Yazmine Laroche agrees with much of 
this assessment, acknowledging that those involved with the establishment of MSIC were not 
looking to “reinvent the wheel” (Laroche 2010). They knew that MSIC had to take a more 
collaborative approach with both the provinces and its fellow departments.  
 
An effort to avoid the failures and emulate the success of the past policy paradigm 
 While federal political actors worked to reassure the provinces that their role in municipal 
affairs was not threatened, the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Urban Issues began an effort 
to emulate the successes of MSUA. The task force made it clear that coordination, 
collaboration and consultation were cornerstones of the new ministry. “We live in an era of 
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policy interdependence,” the report stated, “where actions of one order of government have 
an effect on other governments” (Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues 
2002:6). MSUA had found success when it initially established itself as a forum for 
discussion and coordination, but when it began to fund projects the provinces became 
concerned about their jurisdiction. The task force felt the need to emphasize that early 
success.  
 
The task force also emphasized eight responsibilities that a designated urban affairs minister 
should hold, including chairing and coordinating a National Urban Summit with First 
Ministers and urban policy advocates, coordinating policies between different federal 
ministries, and creating an external urban affairs advisory body (Prime Minister’s Caucus 
Task Force on Urban Issues 2002:8). All three recommendations echoed the early successes 
of MSUA, such as the tri-level meetings, the inter-departmental collaboration and urban 
working groups.  
 
At the departmental level, MSIC made it clear that it would not fund federal projects and that 
any projects it initiated had to have environmental sustainability as an overarching goal, 
removing the potential for influence from or interdependence with many line departments. 
The only ministry that MSIC occasionally came into conflict with was the Ministry of 
Transport. For the most part, these disagreements were solved amicably through project 
sharing: Transport would lead the negotiations and MSIC would lead the efforts to fund the 
project. Two working groups were established to ensure “buy in” from other departments, 
managing their expectations and maintaining open channels of communication (Laroche 
2010).  
 
Once created, MSIC made a concerted effort to avoid the failures of MSUA. First and 
foremost, MSIC designed itself as a partner in a broader urban affairs strategy, not as the 
lead. The ministry was clear that the provinces were ultimately in control of municipal 
affairs and that the federal government’s role was to provide assistance and coordination 
where it was feasible. Discussions and negotiations took place only between the federal 
government and their provincial colleagues. There were no direct negotiations with cities 
unless sanctioned by provinces. Memorandums of Understanding were struck for each 
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project initiated through MSIC to ensure that affected provinces and municipalities 
understood their role in relation to the federal government and were comfortable with the 
arrangement. The Finance Minister met with municipalities in pre-budget consultations and 
kept the provinces informed on their long-term planning in regards to the urban policy realm. 
 
Who learns? When do they learn? 
There was one institutional actor that was common throughout both ministries: the Privy 
Council Office (PCO). During the MSUA era, the Privy Council was not as active in its 
operations or decision-making, but as a central agency largely responsible for provincial-
federal relations, the Privy Council Office did field the outcomes of MSUA’s occasionally 
conflict-ridden multi-level relations. When tri-level meetings failed and certain provinces did 
not attend, it was the Privy Council that was responsible for crafting a response (Newman 
1987:60). Overtime, the Privy Council Office became more involved with the operations and 
strategic decision-making of MSUA, in an attempt to “rationalize” planning and policy 
process (Gertler 1987:110).  
 
When comparing MSUA and MSIC, what is striking is the level of influence the Privy 
Council had over the process leading up to the creation of MSIC. In 2002, the Task Force on 
Urban Issues was created in the PCO (Forster 2010) and when it was time to further steps 
with the Office of Infrastructure and Crown Corporations, it was André Juneau, the Deputy 
Secretary of Operations for the PCO that was selected to be its lead. The Cities Secretariat, 
established in 2003, was created within the PCO. After the creation of MSIC, we still see the 
influence of the PCO in both coordinating MSIC and its fellow departments and provincial-
federal relations (Juneau 2010). 
 
The PCO is an institution with a collective memory. Unlike the two ministries themselves, 
the PCO is consistent throughout both eras. After MSUA was dismantled, many of the 
employees and managers were dispersed throughout the government, leaving little 
institutional memory. Other ministries that have endured throughout both eras, such as 
Transport and Treasury Board, had a minimal amount of interaction with MSUA, especially 
in their relationship with the provinces, but the PCO, an institutional actor tasked with 
maintaining the internal and external relationships of the federal government, did. Because of 
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this relationship, the PCO took a more active role in the life of MSIC. It acted as an arbiter 
between MSIC and its fellow departments and ensured that MSIC had a more collaborative 
relationship with the provinces. Without the Privy Council, and its role as a learner and 
teacher, MSIC could very well have followed MSUA.  
 
With that said, there is a need to consider the alternative hypothesis put forward at the 
beginning of this paper, namely that the altered approach of MSIC was merely the result of 
thirty years of general institutional experience with intergovernmental and interdepartmental 
interaction. In this case, specialized learning would not occur. One of the problems with the 
policy-learning paradigm itself is sorting out this general type of learning from specialized 
learning about specific policy areas. Studying MSUA and MSIC presents just this challenge. 
There can be no doubt that the years between MSUA’s closure and MSIC’s inception were 
tumultuous for Canadian federalism. The rise of regionalism and the strengthening of the 
provinces marked this time span and when MSIC was created, it would be natural to assume 
that policy-makers would create the department with these events in mind. The specific 
changes made, however, would indicate that a very specific type of learning was in fact 
occurring.  
 
Interdepartmental and intergovernmental relations were identified as factors that contributed 
to MSUAs downfall. In both cases, those tasked with creating MSIC took proactive steps to 
correct what were seen as past errors. Safeguards were put in place to ensure 
interdepartmental cooperation, while rules were designed to guide interactions with the 
provinces. These were specific measures to avoid what policy-crafters viewed as MSUA’s 
failures.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs began as a coordinating ministry but quickly moved 
into direct project funding within municipalities, often at the exclusion of the provinces. 
Other ministries in the federal government also feared jurisdictional intrusion on the part of 
MSUA and worked internally to undermine its efforts. These two factors worked against 
MSUA and it was eventually shut down. MSIC, on the other hand, remained a coordinating 
ministry and did not enter into project funding without provincial approval. Tensions were 
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reduced with other ministries through a system of sharing project leadership, reducing the 
interdepartmental friction that Oberlander argues ultimately led to MSUA’s downfall.  
 
It has been argued (Levy 1994; May 1992) that policy failure, either real or perceived, 
strongly influences future policy paradigms. In this case, there is a convincing argument that 
the comparison between MSUA and MSIC reflects policy learning. The Privy Council, once 
tasked with sustaining the relationship between Ottawa and the provinces that had been 
strained by MSUA’s entrance into the urban sphere, worked to ensure that MSIC’s 
relationship with not only the provinces, but also its fellow departments, would be different. 
Thus the two conditions of institutional policy learning, addressed earlier, were present with 
the creation of MSIC which recognises previous policy efforts and an effort to avoid past 
failures and emulate past successes. Those involved with MSIC argued that they wanted to 
create a ministry with a more positive approach towards the provinces and their fellow 
departments. The institutional knowledge necessary to put this change into practice, 
however, came from the Privy Council Office.  
 
References 
Barker, A. 1973. “Ottawa Won’t Play Banker’s Role in Urban Problems, Basford Says.” Globe and 
Mail (national edition), 5 June: 9.  
Bennett, Colin J.. and Michael. Howlett. 1991. “The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of 
Policy Learning and Policy Change.” Policy Sciences 25 (3) August: 275-294.  
Bovens, Mark and Paul t’Hart. 1996. Understanding Policy Fiascoes. New Brunswick:  
 Transaction Press.  
Clark, C. and J. Lewington. 2004. “Big Cities Dislike Proposal for Dividing Cash.” Globe and Mail 
(national edition), 29 July: A7. 
Etheridge, Lloyd S. 1981. “Government Learning: An Overview,” in The Handbook of Political 
 Behaviour, Vol. 2, eds. Samuel L. Long. New York and London: Plenum Press, 
Ethridge, Lloyd S. and James Short. 1983. “Thinking About Government Learning,” in Journal 
 Of Management Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1.  
Feldman, Lionel D. and Katherine A. Graham. Bargaining for Cities: Municipalities and  
 Intergovernmental Relations: An Assessment. Toronto: Institute for Research on Public 
 Policy, 1979.  
Forster, J. 2010. Personal interview with Associate Deputy Minister, Infrastructure  
 Canada, 16 March.  
Gertler, Len. 1987. “Research Based Urban Policy,” in The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs: 
 A Courageous Experiment in Public Administration, eds. H. Peter Oberlander and Arthur 
 SPICER: Institutional policy learning and formal federal-urban engagement  
 
CJLG November 2010 118  
 L. Fallick. Vancouver: UBC Press. 
Globe and Mail. 1976. “Danison Will Contact Provinces on Housing Warranty Programs.” Globe and 
Mail (national edition), 30 January: B3.  
Globe and Mail 2002. “A Little Something for Canada’s Cities.” Globe and Mail (national edition), 3 
May: A14  
Globe and Mail 2003. “Parliamentary Secretaries Will Report to Martin.” Globe and Mail (national 
edition), 13 December: A13.  
Globe and Mail 2004. “Martin’s Cities Agenda Belongs in Major Cities.” Globe and Mail (national 
edition), 20 August: A12.  
Hall, Peter. 1989. “Conclusion: The Politics of Keynesian Ideas,” in The Political Power of 
 Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, eds. Peter A. Hall. Princeton: 
 Princeton University Press.  
Hall, Peter. 1993. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic  
 Policy Making in Britain,” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3.  
Howlett, Michael and M. Ramesh. 2003. Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy  
 Subsystems. Toronto: Oxford University Press.  
Infrastructure Canada. 2004. Report on Plans and Priorities. Ottawa: 
Government of Canada.  
Infrastructure Canada 2005. Report on Plans and Priorities. Ottawa: Government of Canada.  
Infrastructure Canada 2006. Report on Plans and Priorities. Ottawa; Government of Canada.  
Juneau, A. 2010. Personal interview with former Deputy Minister, Ministry of State for  
 Infrastructure and Communities, 26 March.  
Laroche, Y. 2010. Personal interview with former Assistant Deputy Minister for Cities 
 and Communities, Ministry of State for Infrastructure and Communities, 26 
 April.  
Levy, J. 1994. “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” in  
 International Organization 48 (2): 279-312.  
Lewington, J. 2002. “Ontario Wants Federal Deal Before Altering City Powers.” Globe and Mail 
(national edition), 18 June: A6. 
Lewington 2004. “Ottawa Ready to Move on ‘New Deal’ for Cities.” Globe and Mail (national 
edition), 25 February: A14.  
Liberal Party of Canada. 2004. Moving Canada Forward: The Paul Martin Plan for Getting Things 
Done. Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada.  
May, P. 1992. “Policy Learning and Failure,” in Journal of Public Policy 12(4):  
 331-54.  
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs. 1972. First Annual Report. Ottawa: Government of Canada.  
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 1973. Rapport Annuel pour L’exercise Financier Termine 31 Mars 
1973. Ottawa: Government of Canada.  
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 1974. Annual Report: 1973-74. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 
1974.  
 SPICER: Institutional policy learning and formal federal-urban engagement  
 
CJLG November 2010 119  
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 1975. Annual Report: 1974-75. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 
1975.  
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 1976. Annual Report: 1975-76. Ottawa: Government of Canada.  
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 1977. Annual Report: 1976-77. Ottawa: Government of Canada.  
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 1978. Annual Report: 1977-78. Ottawa: Government of Canada.  
Newman, D.G. “The Golden Hour of Municipal Politics,” in The Ministry of State for Urban  
 Affairs: A Courageous Experiment in Public Administration, eds. H. Peter Oberlander 
 and Arthur L. Fallick. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987.  
Oberlander, H. Peter and Arthur L. Fallick. The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs: A  
 Courageous Experiment in Public Administration. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987.  
Pal, Leslie A. 2006. Beyond Policy Analysis: Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times. Toronto: 
Thomson Nielson.  
Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues. 2002. Canada’s Urban Strategy: A Blueprint 
for Action. Ottawa: Government of Canada.  
Plunkett, T.J. 2004. “A Nation of Cities Awaits Paul Martin’s ‘New Deal’ – Federal Funds for 
‘Creatures of the Provinces’.” Policy Options, February 2002, 23.  
Rose, R. 1988. “Comparative Policy Analysis: The Program Approach,” in Comparing Pluralist 
Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy, eds. Mattei Dogan. Boulder: Westview Press.  
Rusk, J. 2003. “Godfrey Handed New Cities Post.” Globe and Mail (national edition), 12 December: 
A18.  
Sabathier, P. “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of 
 Policy Oriented Learning Therin,” in Policy Sciences 21 1988.  
Scoffield, H. 2002a. “Ottawa Promises Cities ‘New Deal’.” Globe and Mail (national edition), 19 
February: A9.  
Scoffield. 2002b. “Urban Funding Dominates Liberal Battles.” Globe and Mail (national edition), 15 
July: A4.  
Stritch, Andrew. 2005. “Power Resources, Institutions and Policy Learning: The Origins of Workers’ 
Compensation in Quebec,” in Canadian Journal of Political Science 38 (3) September: 
549-579. 
Taber, J. 2004. “PMO Left Stalwarts Hanging.” Globe and Mail (national edition), 21 July: A1. 
Watkins, L. 1972. “Provinces Will Not Tolerate Encroachment on their Rights in Urban Affairs.” 
Globe and Mail (national edition), 4 August: 3.  
Winsor, H. 2002. “Urban Problems Prompt an Attack of the Dithers.” Globe and Mail (national 
edition), 2 May: A4. 
